Haig still has defenders and critics, to this day. No book on him is likely to be entirely objective. After the War Haig was a national hero. He had, after all, played a large part in winning it. By the 1960s he became seen as a butcher and bungler. Such is history.
He clearly had many faults, both personal and professional, but his post-War critics such as David Lloyd George and Churchill could not be said to be without imperfections, and their assessments must be seen in the light of their relationship with him.
In 1963 John Terraine wrote Haig: The Educated Soldier, countering the popular view. Some see it as a reasoned analysis, others as seriously mistaken. And so it goes on.
As I've discovered over the years, the only sensible thing to do is read as much as you can on the subject. Might I suggest that you start with
Douglas Haig War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918
These are, at least, his own words, although we can never be sure of his actual thoughts. Then start reading some biogs, of which there are, as you say, plenty. Probably better to use the Library Service; buying them all would be a very expensive exercise. Eventually you might come to a view. It shouldn't take more than 90 years.
At school I thought History must be dead simple- just make a note of things as you go along. I know better now.
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In my opinion the reason Haig has been slighted in the later years is because people based their thoughts and reasoning on how it would have been different, many years later ...If only they could just think how people thought in those days and of course stratergy was so much different ...Yes i know Haig was a swash buckling horse man charges and the like ..The tank was a turning point towards many battles then and in future battles ...
Yes, I think you have it right - the "great task" of historians is what one of them (Thompson) described as rescuing the past from "the immense condescension of posterity" yet it is the inevitable trap which even they find so difficult to avoid. Similarly, soldiers know well the error of "re-fighting the last war" - there are (of course) none of them so stupid as not to know that. An historian who knew well the art (certainly it is no science) of interpreting the past in its own terms (Bryant) - and a appalled spectator at the denigration of Haig's leadership through "false legend" - described the counter-trap:
As a result (of risk aversion based on intensive study of the mistakes of 1914-18) the French military mind, pursuing logic further than it is wise in an illogical world, had gone to the other extreme and enthroned the defensive as the secret of war. He is talking there about French planning and preparations in response to the growing threat of fascism in the 1930s - and those measures were mostly inadequate for the test to come. The "other extreme" to which he refers was the political (but certainly not professional) British response to entering a conflict for which their landforces were almost totally unprepared - a determination, fortunately tempered by the commanders on the ground, for the BEF in 1939 to "recreate as quickly as possible the conditions of Sir Douglas Haig's triumph of 1918."
Well Bryant had his own problems but he is surely correct to infer that our "retrospective wisdom" may well be found wanting on those rare occasions when it can be tested in the merciless light of reality, as seen in 1939 (the French side), and if that retrospective wisdom is to be exposed at all (the criticisms of Haig seemingly not at all affecting the attitudes of those committing the British force).
Sadly, any modern mavens then found wanting or irrelevant seldom retract (for whatever reasons) and their myths - arguably slanders in some cases - maintain.
Retrospective wisdom is somehow related to the 'what if' question too: What if the British had succeeded in the counter attack at Arras in 1940, if the Belgian chasseurs hadn't retreated after barricading the Ardennes roads, if Rommel wouldn't have found a way to get over the Maas, when the Dutch etc... A defeated nation has an urge for plaudible explanations and excuses, so some get the blame, generals, political leaders, other allies and when that's not enough mysterious myths arise, about 5th column and treason. Or the unsportsmanlike behaviour of the enemy, having a superior technology too. For proving the facts, autobiographics or diaries aren't the most reliable sources I guess as people have that habit to buff up their own role, not to mention the inflated ego's of more than one general, no matter if victorious or defeated.
Quite so - autobiography is always to some degree self-seeking and we are seldom critical enough of the comprehension and motives of critics and commentators.
