hi , there seems to be an urban myth that more tank crews died from carbon monoxide poisioning + becoming overcome by exhust fumes then died of wounds from enemy action - is there any truth to this ? are there any reports of actual crew deaths caused bu monoxide poisonong etc?
Most common cause was artillery. The CO thing is a myth that has got into the system and, like all such, is difficult to get rid of. Can't remember the details now, but I have seen the claim stated in a book somewhere - Band of Brigands? - but also vaguely remember a contemporary report that showed the whole thing was rubbish. In fact, I think the evidence was that, although a lot of men were ill, no one at all died from CO inhalation. I'll try to find the source.
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I haven't read any primary documents, but I have read Tank Warfare, Tanks and Trenches, The Boilerplate War, Tanks at Flers, and many others. I don't recall reading of anybody dying from CO poisoning. Lots of people made sick and forced to rest, but no deaths.
As James says, most deaths caused by artillery.
There is a story, I recall, of a Whippet crew forced to abandon ship because of fumes. But those were petrol fumes. Spare fuel cans on the roof had been pierced by bullets and the crew compartment was ankle deep in petrol. But that's not CO poisoning, and they didn't die from breathing in the vapour.
Unfortunately it's now mentioned, in possibly both but at least in one of either a sound recording in the Mk V** or written down somewhere in the Tank Museum. Poor show
Interesting. I would have thought there was seepage anyway of exhaust from any cracks/gasket gaps. (Ad of course petrol washed into the hot oil from poor piston rings, surely.) But what about exhaust fumes drawn from the "official" exhaust into the vehicle by the radiator cooling fans? Do the modifications to rhomboid exhausts not point to a perceived problem?
Also, the engine was not the only source of CO. There would also be plenty of CO from the cordite propellant used in 6pdr and MG (lots of MGs, remember) armament, too, venting into the fighting compartment from the breeches and from the ejected cases. For a modern comparison, admittedly with much higher standards, I believe that at least one vehicle had to be withdrawn from modern service because of an insuperable problem with CO from the fired gun, but I may be wrong here.
Also, the obvious point strikes me that CO cannot be seen as an isolated problem. It would have added to hydrocarbon intoxication (if any) and motion sickness amd
(a) be as good as killing the tank as far as the Germans were concerned, at least for that occasion (a self-inflicted "mission kill"), if it incapacitated the crew for their mission
(b) compound with other risks and make other hazards that much more lethal thanks to reduction of crew efficiency in spotting/reacting to them (i.e. the Germans, a shellhole in front, etc.)
How important this actually was is another matter, but (to take a very different arena) D. Brown's fine books on 20th century Royal Navy ship design and development show that motion sickness leading to crew incapacity was a real worry, and a factor in the design of postwar (post-WW2) escort ships. What is clear is that in earlier decades the poor devils everywhere - in the Atlantic or the Western Front - were expected to lump it even if it was positively counterproductive.
Hadn't appreciated the problems with CO resulting from discharge of the tanks' own weapons when (typically) buttoned-up for combat but yes, I see it was (and remains) a significant problem to be addressed in tank design. From:
Textbook of Miltary Medicine Part III Disease and the Environment Occupational Health: The Soldier and the Industrial Base(Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington D.C., 1993) Lorraine B. Davis Senior Editor Colleen Matthews Quick Volume Editor Specialty Editors David P. Deeter, Joel C. Gaydos
Chemical Hazards
pp359 et seq. Chapter 10 Combustion Products of Propellants and Ammunition Donald B. Kirchner, M.D., M.P.H.; Joel C. Gaydos, M.D., M.P.H and Mario C. Battigelli, M.D., M.P.H During World War I, two new knds of weapons systems significantly increased soldiers' exposure to the toxic products of propellant combustion: the battlefield tank with a breechloading gun, and the rapid-firing machine gun. The battlefield tank essentially enclosed the space around its gun breech. Because ventilation was often inadequate, air inside the tank quickly became oppressive, and it was painful for the crew to breathe. When under enemy fire, the crew could close all the tank hatches and be relatively protected from outside threat, but they were at greater risk from their own gun's combustion products inside the tank. Chemical warfare forced soldiers to protect themselves in the field by sealing themselves inside their fortifications. Rapid-firing machine guns produced dangerous levels of carbon monoxide from incomplete propellant combustion inside these these enclosed fortifications; for the first time, the gas produced by the combustion of propellants was itself reported to be the cause of casualties. Tables in the book subsequently reveal that, even with current smokeless powders, carbon monoxide remains the major toxic combustion product. With so many hands in its production the textbook is a bit of a hodgepodge and contemporary accounts, though adequately referenced, are uninformed by subsequent investigations - a matter not entirely resolved in the text. From the next chapter it is clear that engine exhaust gasses are usually the greater problem but that emissions from the guns, particularly those from the main gun, play a significant part in the accumulation of CO in the crew space.
pp 397 et seq. Chapter 11 Carbon Monoxide Timothy B. Weyandt, M.D., M.P.H. and Caharles David Ridgeley, Jr., M.D., M.S. The same problem (carbon monoxide poisoning) had, of course, been recognized during World War I. In the early days of tank warfare, crews who spent prolonged times inside their tanks complained of headache and faintness. These problems became more severe as later tank models were introduced. Signs and symptoms of exposure were clearly related to exposure to the toxic exhaust gases and ambient heat burden. Although the soldiers sometimes became unconscious while in the tanks, they more frequently collapsed after reaching fresh air. The symptoms were aggravated when they fired the Hotchkiss and 6-pounder guns.
The interior design of the early tanks permitted heat accumulation and exposure to toxic combustion gases because the exhaust lines ran along the inside of the tanks for some distance before they perforated the plating to the outside. As a consequence, carbon monoxide exposures from both internal leakage and backdraft from other tanks were common. The restricted crew space within the tank allowed significant accumulation of moisture, which further complicated the heat-exposure potential. In one incident, reported in 1918, the first and second tank drivers became unconscious. When the tank commander took control as the driver, he also succumbed and the tank was unable to get into action because of the condition of the crew. Clearly, improved tank ventilation was required. A supply of fresh, outside air was provided via infiltration around gun ports and other openings,
Seemingly that adds heat stress into the equation too. Subsequent chapters deal with other pollutants/toxins, some affecting tank crews to (usually) a lesser extent. Not addressed in those sections (but no doubt dealt with elsewhere) are the issues affecting crew efficiency (and hence vehicle survivability) of "motion sickness" as mentioned by Lothianman and also the innumerable opportunities to accumulate contusions and lacerations in any AFV, even a slow-moving one. Oh, and noise too - that definitely detracts from tank crew efficiency. A "reverse" illustration. Sandy MacGregor tells the story of a TD-15 operator ('dozer, not tank but similar noise levels to an early tank) of 3 Fd Tp RAE blythly beavering away in the heart of a VietCong attack in 1965 while wearing his ear muffs. Well, he survived unscathed in his person once he understood the frantic signals to take them off and thus appreciate the need to take cover but his underpants were a different matter. A rare example of how Occupational Health and Safety might kill you.
But, as already mentioned, none of these factors noted as a direct cause of tank crew deaths (taking the term "casualties", to imply incapacitation far more than it does death).
-- Edited by Rectalgia on Monday 10th of September 2012 06:26:15 AM
But what about exhaust fumes drawn from the "official" exhaust into the vehicle by the radiator cooling fans? Do the modifications to rhomboid exhausts not point to a perceived problem?
Re cooling fans, would they not have been blowing air out through the vent at the back (near the exhaust), rather than drawing it in? That is, sucking air from the fighting compartment through the rad rather than outside air (and exhaust fumes!).
The only mods to rhomboid exhausts that I am currently aware of were external (the addition of a muffler and exhaust pipe extending to the rear, over the top of the roof), and surely would not have made any difference to fume levels inside the tanks.
TinCanTadpole wrote: Re cooling fans, would they not have been blowing air out through the vent at the back (near the exhaust), rather than drawing it in? That is, sucking air from the fighting compartment through the rad rather than outside air (and exhaust fumes!).
That's exactly how they worked; they took air from inside the fighting compartment and blew it over the radiator and out the vent at the back. Except for the Mark V, which sucked it from the outside, on one side, passed it across the radiator cooling fins, and blew it out on the other, leaving the air more or less stagnant inside the fighting compartment.
On all the marks, a big problem was that the different metals of the engine and the exhaust, expanded and contracted at different rates, often leading to gaps opening up at joins and seams etc.
However, debilitating nausea, decreased concentration, and other symptoms, are not deaths. So, going back to greenbdg's question, it looks like there's no proof for CO poisoning killing more tankers than any other method.
